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Abstract: Multinational corporations’ tax practices are
hotly debated nowadays. Multinationals are accused of
not paying their fair share of taxes. Apparently, acting
within the limits set by law is not sufficient to qualify as
morally responsible behavior anymore.
This article offers ethical reflection on the current de-
bate. The general public typically evaluates (aggressive)
tax planning inmoral terms rather than legal terms. There-
fore, multinationals need to reflect on their tax planning
strategy next to economic and legal terms also in ethi-
cal terms. This article addresses the relationship between
society, morality and taxes. The concepts of tax plan-
ning, “aggressive tax planning”, “tax evasion” and “tax
avoidance” are elaborated on to exemplify the difference
between a purely legal and broader approach. In moral
terms, aggressive tax planning may imply loss of integrity
and trust which may entail certain costs for businesses,
such as reputation damage. It will be argued that in order
to improve corporate reputation and (moral) leadership,
corporate social responsibility (CSR), endorsed by many
corporations around the globe, is a helpful tool. Reflection
on tax planning in the context of CSR – good tax gover-
nance – should foster a moral mind set and enhance ac-
countability and transparency.
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1 Introduction
Multinationals’ tax practices are the subject of much dis-
cussion nowadays. During the last decade, the amount
of tax that multinational enterprises (MNEs) pay has be-
come a subject of interest to much larger circles of actors
than just the tax authorities. The media has been report-
ing stories about tax avoidance and/or companies not pay-
ing their “fair share” of taxes. For instance, the tax plan-
ning techniques used by Amazon, Starbucks and Google
have gained particular focus. In addition, various non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Tax Justice
Network, ActionAid, ChristianAid and SOMO, have pub-
lished critical reports on aggressive tax planning struc-
tures (see, e.g., James 2012, ActionAid 2012, Christian Aid
2013, SOMO 2015). Even consumers have shown interest in
the amount of taxes paid by corporations (see, e.g., Bergin
2012, Kleinbard 2013).
It can therefore be said that multinational enterprises
are currently in the eye of the storm. Their tax planning
practices are claimed to be too aggressive and this has led
to a public outcry. Politicians have shared this public sen-
timent, sometimes even accusing these multinationals of
“immoral” behavior (see, e.g., UK HMRC 2012). There are
no clear signs that the storm will calm soon because both
national and international policymakers have set this is-
sue high on their agenda (see, e.g., OECD BEPS, European
Commission 2016a, UN 2016).What shouldmultinationals
do? Should theywait out the storm or can they still the wa-
ters?
The current debate on tax planning practices of multi-
nationals shows that there is something inherent in tax
planning that is not covered by the traditional legal dis-
tinction between (illegal) corporate tax evasion and tax
avoidance. Aggressive tax planning is not discussed in
terms of legal or illegal behavior, but in moral terms.
Therefore, it requires ethical reflection. Multinational en-
terprises need to reflect on their tax planning strategy –
not only in economic and legal terms, but also in ethical
terms. Therefore, this article addresses the relationshipbe-
tween society, morality and taxes (§2). The next issue to
be dealt with is that of moral agency (§3). Morality regards
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the behavior of individuals, but does it also concern the
behavior of businesses? Furthermore, the concept of tax
planning is elaborated on, and the relationship between
lawandmorality in relation to the concepts “aggressive tax
planning”, “tax evasion” and “tax avoidance” will be dis-
cussed (§4). Taxes are a cost item for a business enterprise,
which indicates that companies need to mitigate that. On
the other end, too aggressive a tax planning burdens the
society with costs, and moreover, may imply certain costs
for business, such as reputation damage, for example (§5).
It will be argued that in order to improve corporate reputa-
tion and regain public trust, corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) is a helpful tool.
Currently, many companies embrace CSR, which en-
tails several kinds of obligations towards the society (§6).
The question is, however, whether a business’ CSR should
also reflect (moral) leadership in relation to its tax strat-
egy? Moreover, does the ethical obligation to go beyond
what is required by the law – key to CSR companies – en-
compass, for instance, tax transparency? These questions
structure this article. It will be argued that in light of CSR,
good tax governance should enhance accountability and
transparency. In this regard, in §7,making a distinction be-
tween an intrinsic motivation to do the right thing (with a
favorable reputation as an upshot) and extrinsic motiva-
tion (such as concern for favorable reputation in order to
boost shareholder value) will be proposed.
As for methodology, this article first explores theoret-
ical literature on morality in order to argue that corporate
tax planninghas amoral dimension to it and subsequently
to better understand the extent of moral responsibility of
corporate entities in relation to their tax planning prac-
tices. Further, the (empirical) research on corporate rep-
utation is studied for understanding one of the possible
reasons why corporations should be motivated to recon-
sider their tax planning behavior. As a last step, the nor-
mative element of this article proposes CSR as a possible
solution formore ethical corporate tax behavior. Thus, this
is an interdisciplinary research. Naturally, this article is a
subject to several limitations. First, the existing empirical
research on corporate tax planning, tax ethics and repu-
tation is scarce. Second, the normative part on taxation in
the context of CSR is dealt with in a rather summarily way
and theoretical details and discussions are therefore ig-
nored. Therefore, this article should be seen as a first step
and invitation for further research.
2 Society Involves Morality
Taxes are contributions to society. In this regard, society
can be seen as “a cooperative venture for mutual advan-
tage [...] typically marked by a conflict as well as by an
identity of interests”, in the famous words of the politi-
cal philosopher John Rawls (Rawls 1999, 4). Elaborating
on famous seventeenth century social contract theorists
such as ThomasHobbes and JohnLocke, Rawls argues that
social cooperation “is always productive and without co-
operation there would be nothing produced and so noth-
ing to distribute” (Rawls 2001, 61). Cooperation, of course,
regards a specific kind of relation between individuals;
those engaged in this system of social cooperation rely on
one another to do their part. Here, morality comes in, for
morality addresses not only the question as to how one
ought to live as an individual, but also how individuals in-
teract with other individuals. In addition to the question
of a good life (i.e., “how should I live?”), there is the issue
of a good society (“how should we live as a society?”). We
focus on the latter.
Being a part of the society entails moral rights and
obligations. The central question of morality then is how
one should live in relation to other individuals. How
should we treat other individuals in society and take into
account their interests – and not only our own interests?
(Bloomfield 2007, 3-4). It is not just about what is normal
to do, but what is proper and (morally) right to do. What is
good behavior towards others andwhat is the good society
to which one should aspire? Other individuals are “others
with whom we interact personally, as well as those more
distant who may be affected by what we do”, in the words
of themoral philosopherPaine (1996, 478).However,while
it is necessary to consider others’ interests, morality does
not demand that one does this at the expense of one’s own
personal needs and aspirations. Moral agents may see to
their own interests or the interest of their families as hav-
ing special standing (Bloomfield 2007, 3). Amoral point of
view does not require that individuals behave in an altru-
istic way, but rather that they see their personal interests,
objectives and ideals in relation to those of other individ-
uals in society.
Thus, morality is about how one ought to act. Study-
ing ethics concerns thephilosophical inquiry, for example,
to obtain clarity on moral problems and to resolve them
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in an ethically satisfactory way (Callahan 1988, 7).1 Moral-
ity can be seen as a public system, in the sense that there
is shared understanding and knowledge about how one
should act, and that it is not irrational to be guided and
judged by that common morality. But unlike, for exam-
ple, the legal system, morality is an informal public sys-
tem (that all impartial persons could accept): “it has no au-
thoritative judges and no decision procedure that provides
unique answers to all moral questions” (Gert 1998, 11).
This informal system covers “those practices and activities
that are considered importantly right or wrong; the rules
that govern those activities; and the values that are em-
bedded, fostered, or pursued by those activities and prac-
tices” (De George 1999, 19). But the term “morality” also
covers principles, ideals and virtues. Thus, this informal
public system that governs behavior affecting other per-
sons including moral rules, principles, values, ideals and
virtues, may, however, entail conflicting and competing
demands. The moral philosopher Callahan (1988) illus-
trates this with regard to conflicting moral values. Moral
problems involve questions of value. Moral issues involve
value dilemmas: the protection or furthering of one value
or a set of values inevitably demands the sacrifice of some
other value or a set of values. And not to decide in favor
of one value or a set of values is “equivalent to deciding
in favor of the competing value or set of values” (Callahan
1988, 7). These moral issues should not be handled in an
opportunisticway; values, principles, etc., shouldnot sim-
ply be dusted off on occasion.
Paine focuses on the importance of principles and val-
ues. She argues that moral thought can be usefully distin-
guished in two – related and overlapping – levels (Paine
1996, 480). First, there is “principled thinking”: individu-
als “need a moral framework of principles and values for
routine use in their daily lives” (Paine 1996, 479).2 This
regards often rather intuitive, unreflective moral think-
ing, but not necessarily so; it may also involve delibera-
tion. Routine actions and deliberation, however, should
be based on systematic moral reflection. There is therefore
also a second, “critical” level: people need a method or
strategy to select these principles for routine use on an ev-
eryday basis and to deal with conflicts among them. At the
first level, the choices of individuals should be guided by
1 Ethics studies morality (De George 1999, 19). The philosophical
study of morality is called ethics or moral philosophy, although often
the terms “moral” and “ethical” are used interchangeably.
2 She follows Hare’s distinction between two levels of moral think-
ing: an intuitive level (rephrased by Paine as principled thinking) and
a critical level fromwhich to select, evaluate and adjudicate between
the first-level practices and principles (Hare 1992).
generalmoral principles or valueswhichareusedas akind
of filter. These general principles of principled thinking
are twofold: they encompass general principles of social
morality, on the one hand, and the special principles as-
sociated with social roles that individuals occupy or with
personal ideals, on the other.
Solidarity, responsibility and reciprocity are examples
of general principles. In a (international) tax context, some
(special) principles that may spring to mind are the equal-
ity principle (level playingfield), the fairness principle and
the single tax principle. Principled thinking provides guid-
ance for everyday life. It guides one’s decisions when one
chooses to act in a certain way because it is one’s duty, or
if one will help someone in need, or one will advance an
important ideal. Of course, principled thinking can also
prohibit a course of action because it would be deceptive,
unfair, unlawful, a breach of trust, a violation of rights
and so on. As stated above, day-to-day principled think-
ing should be preceded by critical reflection. At this sec-
ond, critical level, another mode of moral thinking is in-
volved. Individuals should anticipate the consequences of
alternative choices, achieve a sympathetic understanding
of the interests of those affected and identify the course of
action likely to do the best. The interests of each affected
party should be considered impartially (Paine 1996, 480).
In this context, tax-related questions include: how does
one’s minimal, but legal, compliance affect other individ-
uals, and what impact might this kind of minimalist com-
pliance have on the provision of public goods such as in-
frastructure, education and health care. This kind of com-
pliance is seen as aggressive tax planning (see §4). This
affects others for an individual’s tax burden is shifted to
other individuals in the society (distributive justice), or the
budget is dented causing less public goods and therefore
diminishing the well-being of others. Morality clearly re-
quires taking into account these kinds of interests of other
individuals.
3 State, morality and the law
The stability of social cooperation is preserved by the coer-
cive powers of government in modern society where peo-
ple are often perfect strangers. Government nowadays pro-
vides the institutional conditions making modern civiliza-
tion and economic activity possible. Consequently, gov-
ernment is substantially responsible for the kinds of lives
including their options and choices thatmembers of an ex-
isting community can lead (Murphy and Nagel 2002, 41-
42). An elaborate legal system is a part of this institutional
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framework that supports and enables social cooperation.
It regulates relationships betweenmembers of society and
thus ensures a degree ofmutual trust (Rawls 1999, 206-211;
Gribnau 2017a, 40-41).
The legal system contains rights and obligations. This
also goes for taxation. The legislature determines that the
share taxpayers have to contribute to society and “trans-
lates” this in tax laws. The obligation to contribute to so-
ciety has nowadays crystallized out in a large number of
very complex legal rules containing detailed provisions of
taxpayers’ obligations and rights.
In passing we note that liberals like Rawls, Murphy
and Nagel, argue for far more government intervention
and public goods than is palatable to libertarian philoso-
phers such as Nozick. Libertarians claim that freedom
from human restraint is necessarily good and constraints
by others are only justified to prevent the imposition of
greater human constraints. According to Nozick, the state
should thus restrict itself to protecting every person’s right
to freedom from coercion which prevails over all other
rights and values. This minimal “state is inspiring as well
as right” (Nozick 1974, ix). For him, the redistributive taxes
are a form of coercion, even theft. This is quite an ex-
treme position. “Taxation of earning from labor is on a par
with forced labor” (Nozick 1974, 169; see however Faulkner
2017). Given the high level of taxation in Western liberal
states financing all kinds of public goods and redistribu-
tive policies, libertarian taxpayerswill probably try tomin-
imize their tax liability, which is to theirmind based onun-
justified laws for they are levied by a state which to their
minds interferes too much with personal liberty.3
In both a liberal and minimal (libertarian) state, the
taxpayers’ rights and obligations are laid down in a system
of legal rules. Paying taxes as a moral obligation owed by
members of a community to their community is in this way
transformed in an elaborate legal system. The legal system
is thus to be seen as “an institutionalization or codifica-
tion” of ethics into specific principles, rules, regulations,
proscriptions and procedures (Crane and Matten 2007, 5).
However, different choices with regard to the use of the
system of tax rules impact others and society at large in
different ways. This inevitably implies themoral question:
What is good behavior towards others? So, though the (for-
mal) legal system consists of “codified ethics” and is dis-
tinguished from the (informal) ethical system, it does not
3 To complicate things there also so-called left-libertarians who en-
dorse certain “state-like” activities that “classical” right-libertarians
reject (see Duff 2005 and Cohen 2001, 169-175). We will not elaborate
on this position and the attitude towards tax it entails.
exhaustively codify morality. Ethical responsibilities are
therefore not exhaustively codified in the law.With respect
to tax planning, moral questions have to be addressed be-
cause tax law is often not a matter of hard, fast and un-
equivocal rules. The legal system is inevitably imperfect.
Legal rules can be used and complied with in different
ways,withdifferentmoral impacts. Phrased in general and
abstract terms, their application to particular situations is
necessarily often unclear. Furthermore, gaps in the law are
a commonphenomenon.Moreover, there is often a (moral)
choice between different legal rules, and rules can be ma-
nipulated. Interpreting and using the law, therefore, in-
evitably implies making value judgments (Gribnau 2015,
239-240). Thus, although bothmorality and law regard hu-
man behavior, they are to be distinguished. The law does
not exhaust morality. People may take actions that are
good and legal, although the law does not require them
to do so. Many multinationals, for instance, do not make
use of child labor in their factories indeveloping countries,
even though child labor is legal in some of these countries
(Fisher and Lovell 2009, 46). Companiesmay, for example,
accept moral obligations towards (external) stakeholders,
stretching these obligations beyond the legal claims of
their shareholders (Freedman 2006, 46).4 With regard to
tax planning, (corporate) taxpayersmay take a less aggres-
sive stance than minimization – within the boundaries of
the (letter of the) law.5 This suggests that companies can
be seen as moral actors. Whether this really is so and to
what extent businesses bear moral responsibility towards
others, that is, the society, will be discussed next.
4 Businesses and Moral Agency
As stated, the central problem of morality is traditionally
framed in thequestionas tohowone should live in relation
4 These last kinds of obligations account for the category “actions
that are legal but not necessarily just”, for some writers (e.g., Milton
Friedman) argue that there are no obligations on a corporation other
than to obey the lawandmeet thedemands of the shareholders. There
is no need to point out that there are other moral views on the corpo-
ration – a specific kind of cooperation – for parties other than share-
holders may also be affected by the actions of a business, which cre-
ates some kind of moral responsibility (see Jallai and Gribnau 2017).
5 Here we use the term ‘letter of the law’ as shorthand with regard
to tax planning that exploits the technicalities or differences between
tax systems by making use of “a bewildering variety of techniques
(e.g., multiple deductions of the same loss, double-dip leases, mis-
match arrangements, loss-making financial assets artificially allo-
cated to high-tax jurisdictions)” (Piantavigna 2017, 52).
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to other individuals. Society consists of individuals and
organizations, among which are also businesses. Compa-
nies contribute to the society, for example, in the form
of products, services, employment and taxation. Like in-
dividuals, businesses interact with other (corporate) per-
sons and thus affect others (i.e., stakeholders, such as con-
sumers or creditors) and benefit from their actions. Com-
panies benefit from society at large, from all kind of pub-
lic goods funded by taxes. The state fosters innovation (for
example by funding research and development) (Chang
2010, 206),6 encourages investment, promotes economic
growth, boosts worker productivity and stimulates the ef-
ficient use of scarce resources. All these policy goals are
funded by taxes; thus, paid by society, or rather by those
members of society that pay their share of taxes.
As stated above, the central question of morality is
howone should live in relation to other individuals and so-
ciety at large (§2). Individuals, natural persons, are clearly
to be seen as moral agents. But what about corporations?
Are corporations extensions of their members or rather
moral agents in their own right? Are they independent en-
tities and therefore morally accountable for their tax plan-
ning, or is it only possible to hold the individuals involved
in a company morally accountable? Can corporations be
morally responsible for their actions, such as their tax
planning practices? This is the issue of corporate moral
agency.
To our minds, the corporations qualify as moral
agents, for morality does not regard only individuals. Nat-
urally, the corporations are entities that are different from
natural persons. Nevertheless, it makes sense to treat the
corporations as moral agents, because they “have their
own decision making structures, have choices, and justify
them with corporate reasons” (Brown 2005, 123). Compa-
nies as such can therefore refrain fromharming others and
they can account for their behavior by giving moral rea-
sons and assume moral responsibility for their actions af-
fecting others. They are not only legal entities (i.e., artifi-
cial persons at law), but also moral ones (i.e., they have
agency independent of their members).
As Paine argues, morality is as much an organiza-
tional as a personal issue: “organizations shape individu-
als’ behavior” (Paine 1994, 107). Corporations have an in-
6 This goes even for countries which seemingly do not feature that
much government intervention. See, for example, Chang (2010, 206):
“Between the 1950s and 1980s [. . . ] the share of government fund-
ing in total R&D in the supposedly free-market US accounting for, de-
pending on the year, between 47 per cent and 65 per cent, as against
around 20 per cent in Japan and Korea.”
ternal decision making framework which results in deci-
sions that cannot directly be traced back to individual ac-
tors. By way of decision making structures, corporations
establish an explicit or implicit purpose for decisions that
“clearly transcends the individual’s framework for deci-
sions” (Crane and Matten 2007, 45). Corporations make
decisions of their own, to be distinguished from decisions
made by individuals involved in the corporations. More-
over, the presence of organizational norms and an orga-
nizational culture, which delineates acceptable standards
of behavior, are a key feature of companies. The organi-
zational culture consists of a set of shared values, mean-
ings, beliefs and behaviors setting out what is generally
regarded as right or wrong within the company. Organiza-
tional culture influences the ethical decision making and
behavior of individual members. It has been “widely iden-
tified as a key issue in shaping ethical decision making”
(Crane and Matten 2007, 159).
Internal decision making structures and organiza-
tional culture thus account for the fact that the moral de-
cisions of individuals within a corporationmay differ from
those taken by an individual outside that corporation. As
with individuals, the moral point of view requires not that
companies consider only the interests of others, but rather
that companies see their corporate interests and objectives
in relation to those of others. Again, acting in a morally
appropriate way is often a matter of balancing competing
interests, principles, values and ideals. This commitment
to principled thinking should be consistent and not oppor-
tunistic; it must permeate all the company’s actions.
Thus, corporations have a kind ofmoral responsibility
that differs from the responsibility of individuals constitut-
ing the corporation. Thismoral agency is clearly evidenced
by companies engaging in corporate social responsibility,
for they accept the ethical responsibilities vis-à-vis the so-
ciety (see §7). This is a way of taking the responsibilities of
businesses towards society seriously. One’s view on CSR
of course depends on one’s view of the corporation. CSR
companies do not seem to be like the neoliberal free mar-
ket thinkers,whoadvocate that corporations have the obli-
gation to maximize profits and maximize shareholders’
value, nothing more. Milton Friedman, the famous propo-
nent of this libertarian economic philosophy, is indeed of-
ten said to defend a position like this. However, he argued
for the maximization of profits “while conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and
those embodied in ethical custom” (Friedman 1970, 32-33).
Thus, he can be understood as supporting a thin theory
of CSR (Schwartz 2011, 56). Moreover, Friedman’s libertar-
ian economic approach might even be compatible with a
different, richer conception of the moral responsibility of
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corporations (Machan 1999; he spells out a position called
“classical individualism”). Thus, on second thought, even
some free market thinkers may support some kind of CSR
– though to a limited extent. Moreover, Friedman’s view
that the manager is an agent of the owners implicitly sup-
ports the CSR legislation, for “curiously, agency costs ap-
pear to be lowest in the case where governments obligate
CSR activity by the firm” (Salazar and Husted 2008, 150;
they refer to CSR legislation as being proposed in different
countries, such as Spain). This implicit support for legis-
lation might seem to be a bit of a paradox for proponents
of the free market, such as Friedman, who after all do not
favor government intervention.
We defend a thicker conception of the moral responsi-
bility of corporations. It is submitted that the corporation
is comparable to an individual in its moral rights and obli-
gations. Like an individual a corporation should behave
responsibility vis-à-vis othermembers of society. This view
is comparable to the “real entity” viewas discussed byAvi-
Yonah: “Under the real entity view, the corporation is simi-
lar to an individual citizen in its rights andobligations.”He
goes on to maintain that individual citizens and corpora-
tions alike do not have a legal requirement to aid their fel-
low members of the society but they are praised if they do
so. Thus, “the corporation may not be required to engage
in CSR, but corporate management should be encouraged
if they do so” (Avi-Yonah 2014, 10).
In the foregoing, it was implicitly assumed that taxa-
tion has amoral dimension. Themoral requirement of act-
ing in a responsible way being established, we can now
turn to this issue. How does tax planning relate to moral-
ity?
5 Tax Planning
Tax planning, tax avoidance and tax evasion are differ-
ent ways in which businesses respond to tax legislation.
In order to remain in control of their finances, individu-
als and corporations have to know the impact of taxation
and tune their behavior to this impact. Thus, they engage
in tax planning. In an international context, tax planning
is often used to avoid double taxation (Gribnau 2015, 239-
240). For the purpose of this article, tax planning should
be understood in a neutral ethical way, as opposed to, for
example, tax evasion and tax avoidance, which often have
a negative – unethical – overtone. The conventional (le-
gal) distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance
seems to be quite clear. The former is illegal; the latter is
legal. Taken in its broadest sense, the concept of tax avoid-
ance comprises “all arrangements to reduce, eliminate or
defer a tax liability” (Freedman 2014, 336). The term “ag-
gressive tax planning”, in a way, moves away from this le-
gal distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance. Ac-
cording to the European Commission, aggressive tax plan-
ning consists of taking advantage of the technicalities of
a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax
systems for the purpose of reducing the tax liability (Euro-
peanCommission 2012, 2). This downwardmanagement of
taxable income through tax planning activities results in
paying little or no tax; it reflects a calculating, minimalist
compliance with the law.
With this distinction in mind, quite a few (corporate)
taxpayers and their tax consultants are willing to contend
that gaming the system (for example by using tax shel-
ters)7 can be classified as playing by the rules. What is
meant by such a statement is that their game is a strictly
legal one, and playing by the rules is playing by the le-
gal rules. It is all about the letter of the law – stripped to
the bone by gaming the (international) rules. The issue of
aggressive tax planning lies exactly in complying with the
letter of the law, for example bymaking use ofmismatches
(disparities) between various national tax systems, which
then are creatively used by multinationals to pay less tax.
McBarnet (2007, 48) calls it creative compliance with the
law. This kind of tax planning remains within the bound-
ary of the letter of the law (of different jurisdictions), but
nonetheless it is often questioned – for example, by NGOs
and consumers –whether themultinationals pay their fair
share (see §1).
Discussions regarding the concept of fair share seem
to be endless and complex, and it is not the aim of this ar-
ticle to delve deeper into this topic. At themoment, there is
no one uniform understanding of what is the fair amount
of taxes to be paid. Nonetheless, ethical companies should
be aware that it might be that paying a fair share is not al-
ways the same as paying according to the letter of the tax
7 See, for example, Hanlon and Slemrod 2009, 126-127. See their foot-
note 4: “The term ‘tax shelter’ has no universally accepted definition,
and can be used in a variety of ways depending on the context. Our
use of the term refers to complex transactions used by corporations
to obtain significant tax benefits probably never intended by the tax
code; these transactions may not be illegal per se and their use, if
detected, may trigger lengthy processes of IRS assessment and judi-
cial appeal. Our empirical analysis refers to press uses of this term,
and therefore, relates to the interpretation given by the press outlets
themselves.” The appendix to their article also contains a description
of the shelters included in their sample. Also seeBraithwaite 2005, 16:
“What Australians refer to as the market for aggressive tax planning,
Americans refer to as the market for tax shelters.”
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law. Paying (almost) no tax at all in countries where cor-
porations operate and make use of public goods and ser-
vices is in any case not a “fair share”. Responsible com-
panies should be willing to pay a fair share of tax and re-
flect on themoral quality of their tax planning strategy and
practice. They should, thus, account for their tax behav-
ior. Companies willing to engage in responsible tax gover-
nance need to be transparent about their tax strategy and
discuss it with their stakeholders (see §8).
We will give an example of corporate tax planning.
Just as most corporate income tax laws worldwide, the
Netherlands’ corporate income tax law treats interest and
dividend payments differently, by allowing interest ex-
penses as taxable deduction while disallowing dividend
payments. Usually businesses, including all multinational
enterprises, are organized as a group of legal entities, with
a parent company (head office) and subsidiaries. The legal
structuremakes it possible tofinance each subsidiary com-
pany with as much debt or equity as the group may deem
appropriate. From a group perspective, the tax factor shall
often be decisive in this financing decision, as the overall
leverage on group level is not affected by the intra-group
financing structure.8 Tax-wise, a benefit can be obtained
by financing high-taxed subsidiaries with debt and low-
taxed subsidiaries with equity. It is this mechanism that
has led most jurisdictions, in any case the high-tax juris-
dictions, to put some limitation on interest deductions to
protect the domestic corporate tax base. A not too compli-
cated rule, tax deductibility of interest, thus creates a good
deal of tax planning.
Tax planning can however become more aggressive
as exemplified by the phenomenon of “stateless income”.
Kleinbard describes it “as income derived for tax purposes
by a multinational group from business activities in a
country other than the domicile of the group’s ultimate
parent company but which is subject to tax only in a ju-
risdiction that is neither the source of the factors of pro-
duction through which the income was derived, nor the
domicile of the group’s parent company” (Kleinbard 2013,
1517-1518). Starbucks and othermultinational corporations
have made stateless income planning into a widespread
problem (Van den Hurk 2014). Tax avoidance or aggres-
sive tax planning, both ofwhich remainwithin the letter of
the law, have created complicated discussions when such
activities are exercised in an international context. The
problem, namely, is not always the question as to whether
8 Of course, there may be commercial reasons influencing the debt-
to-equity ratio as well, such as currency restrictions, or external fi-
nancing at subgroup level.
multinationals act legally or not, but rather whether they
cross some kind of accepted (moral) line. It has become
clear that this legal understanding of creative compliance
does not exactly correspondwith the public’s understand-
ing of playing by the rules. Taxpayers should therefore be
aware that there is a gap between the idea of playing by the
rules and gaming the legal rules. Their tax planning strate-
gies should take into account the difference between a
strictly legal understanding and the moral understanding
that drives the public outcry over aggressive tax planning
practices. Aggressive tax planning, which boils down to
gaming the system as much as possible, is labelled as “ag-
gressive” because it is perceived as unfair. Moreover, justi-
fying such calculatingminimalist compliancewith the law
asplayingby the rules,may evenbeperceived ashypocrisy
by some (see for example Browning 2007).
However, not all tax planning should be seen as
morally unacceptable. Businesses may, for instance, have
a low effective tax rate because they make use of tax in-
centives (e.g., for R&D). Tax incentives are used to achieve
all kinds of economic, social and cultural policy goals. In
times of financial crisis, for example, businesses benefit
from tax incentives, such as accelerated depreciation. Tax
incentives are used to affect the taxpayers’ behavior, and
are a stimuli for the taxpayers to engage in tax planning
practices that will result in a lower tax burden. Conse-
quently, tax planning in order to make legitimate use of
tax incentives cannot easily be labelled as “aggressive”.
Moreover, states should be aware that steering the tax-
payers’ behavior by way of tax incentives stimulates them
to adopt a calculating attitude towards the tax system.
It breeds a rule-based mindset focused on tax planning.
At some point, the widespread use of tax incentives – to
achieve a host of policy goals – may crowd out ethics.
The dominance of an economic-rational perspective may
replace important legal-ethical principles in the taxpayer
decision-making process.9 Sometimes (the implementa-
tion of) tax legislation incentivizes the use of devices that
are highly artificial – “encouraging a culture of tax avoid-
ance” (Freedman 2006, 371). Thus, the intrinsic,moralmo-
tives of taxpayers to comply could be crowded out by ex-
cessive, complex and unbalanced legislation.
As stated, taxes are contributions to the society. They
enable this “cooperative venture” and embody the distri-
bution of the (financial) burden this societal cooperation
9 Moreover, the fairness of the tax system – the fairness of the dis-
tribution of the tax burden – becomes less transparent. The idea of
distributive justice is thwarted because of – often very legitimate –
policy concerns. See also Gribnau 2015, 233-234.
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entails. Hence, morality is inherent in taxation (see §2).
The moral aspect of taxes does not do away with the sim-
ple fact that taxes are also an expense. Taxpayers may ar-
range their tax affairs as they wish. Both individuals and
businesses may plan and structure their affairs to achieve
a favorable tax treatment within the limits set by the law.
In many jurisdictions, this is a settled case law.10 Taking
tax considerations into account is perfectly legitimate for
natural persons and enterprises, alike. The general pub-
lic should be well aware of this right and the actual ex-
ercise thereof in practice. Most people facing a choice in-
volving paying more or less taxes, for example, when ar-
ranging amortgage, opt for a tax-efficient course of action.
However, the public outcry does not concern companies
achieving a “legitimate” favorable or tax-efficient tax bur-
den, but rather those multinationals that are perceived as
paying hardly any (corporate income) taxes at all. The lat-
ter goes at the expense of public revenue in times of aus-
terity and shifting the tax burden to less expert taxpayers
(level playing field). They do not exactly balance their self-
interest with those of other individuals. That makes such
tax avoiding multinationals free-riders.
In our opinion, the corporate taxpayers who want
to show moral leadership should balance their right to
structure their affairs to achieve a favorable tax treatment
within the limits set by the law with the obligation to ac-
cept the inevitable imperfections of the legal system. Thus,
they should not abuse the letter of the law for their own
good at the expense of society. Just like individual citizens,
corporations are legally required to pay taxes, and are ex-
pected not to engage in over-aggressive tax planning to
minimize their tax obligations (Avi-Yonah 2014, 10). Tax-
payers should therefore impose restraints on themselves
in taking advantage of these inevitable and often unin-
tended imperfections. Tax avoidance, though legal, may
result in free riding, entailing a breach of the duty of fair
play. Society as a cooperative venture implies a duty of fair
play for the individuals accepting the benefitswhich social
cooperation provides. Corporate citizenswho evidently do
not pay any fair share of taxes at all, evade the duty of
fair play. Corporate citizens neglecting this duty violate
the principles of responsibility and reciprocity (Gribnau
2017a). The corporations that fail to meet the values and
moral expectations of society might bear costs for that.
Such costs of tax avoidance can occur in the form of rep-
utation damage. Therefore, we now investigate whether
10 Cf. European Court of Justice, 21 Feb. 2006, Case C-255/02, Hali-
fax plc and others v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, [2006] ECR
I-1609, para. 73.
there is a relationship between negative publicity about a
multinational enterprise’s being involved in tax avoidance
and its corporate reputation.
6 Tax planning, trust and
reputation
Reputationmatters because it “informus aboutwhat prod-
ucts to buy, what companies to work for, or what stocks
to invest in” (Fombrun 1996, 5). Corporate reputation is
according to Ivey a “dynamic, multi-dimensional concept
built on the perceptions of past behavior and a reflection of
future expectations” (Ivey 2010, 337). She goes on to argue
that people use knowledge of a corporation’s past behav-
ior to gauge its future behavior: the “more trust we have
in a corporation, or person, the more certain we are of our
expectations.” Reputation, thus, reflects trust.
In 2012, Starbucks, for example, seemed to be well
aware that its aggressive tax planning practice was the
cause of diminished trust in the UK. Starbucks’ tax plan-
ning strategywas considered too aggressive and it wasmet
with extensive negative publicity, a “naming and sham-
ing” campaign of NGOs and a customer strike. Stake-
holders’ behavior showed that Starbucks’s reputation was
quite vulnerable and it therefore decided to address the
cause of this negative corporate image quickly (see also
Gribnau et al. 2016). Starbucks decided to restore the trust
by showing a change in its tax practice (Engskov 2012a,b).
Kris Engskov, director of the Starbucks UK, stated that
while Starbucks has always paid taxes “to the letter of the
law”, they acknowledge that to retain public trust they
need to do more. In his letter (16 October 2012) Engskov
also noted that Starbucks is “doing business to the high-
est ethical standards” both in sourcing coffee as well as
in paying taxes (Engskov 2012a). Later (6 December 2012)
he added that “the most important asset” Starbucks has
built “in the UK is trust – trust with our employees, cus-
tomers and the wider society in which we operate” (En-
gskov 2012b). He further added that “it is vital to listen
closely to our customers – and that acting responsibly
makes good business sense” (Engskov 2012b). Based on
such statements, we can assume that the multinational
was negatively affected by negative reputation following
the publicity of its tax planning practices. The Starbucks
case shows that tax avoidance could be one of the fac-
tors that can diminish trust and, therefore, also negatively
affect the corporate reputation. According to YouGov re-
search, Starbucks suffered severe reputational damages
after the HMRC hearings in 2012 – even more severe than
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Amazon and Google whose tax planning practices were
also covered by the HMRC public hearing (2012) as well as
media (YouGov 2012, 2014).
Figure 1: Change in Corporate Reputations
Source: YouGov 2012.
The Starbucks case thus shows that corporate repu-
tation, trust and ethical behavior are closely connected.
Multinationals, such as Starbucks, are especially sensi-
tive to reputation damage. The research of Crane and oth-
ers shows that large corporations are much more visible
and thusmore vulnerable to criticism from the public than
smaller firms (Crane et al. 2008, 8-9). Moreover, the way
the general public perceives business’ role in a society has
changed in the last few decades.
Lewis researched the public’s attitude towards large
companies between the late 1970s and early 2000s. He
found that approximately 80% of the respondents believe
that large companies have a moral duty to society. Never-
theless, according to the same respondents (about 60%)
large corporations fall short of the expectations for moral
behavior towards society and environment. As a result, the
corporations are losing public trust (Lewis 2003; see also
Porter 2003;Wan-Jan 2006), which in turnmay have a neg-
ative impact on their reputation. Butwhat exactly is corpo-
rate reputation?
Corporate reputation can be seen as “an overall as-
sessment of an organization by its stakeholders” (Gribnau
et al. 2016). Lange and others characterize organizational
reputation “by a level of familiarity with the organization,
beliefs about what to expect from the organization in the
future, and impressions about the organization’s overall
appeal” (Lange et al. 2011, 178). Thus, to understand the
importance of reputation is to recognize “the social world”
that helps a company to succeed, for a company“works” in
the center of a network of cooperating stakeholders (Fom-
brun 1996, 21). A reputation is the result of judgments in
moral terms for it is “the aggregate of many personal judg-
ments about the company’s credibility, reliability, respon-
sibility, and trustworthiness” (Fombrun 1996, 72). Thus,
corporate reputation entails a “value judgement” (Gray
and Balmer 1998, 679), for stakeholders take values into
account when evaluating a corporation’s behavior. Taking
these values seriously reflects a corporation’s commitment
to “others with whom we interact personally, as well as
those more distant who may be affected by what we do”
(Paine 1996, 478). Dealing with these values in a responsi-
ble way enhances the community’s acceptance of a corpo-
ration’s behavior. Corporate reputation is thus “related to
the acceptance of the community where a company is op-
erating” (Melé 2008, 49; see also Lewis 2003). Therefore,
in order to have a social license to operate from the society,
multinationals need to show that they respect the social
morals and values. Thus, they need to show that by con-
tributing to the public goods and services by paying taxes
they are not free-riders.
Hence, “purely legal boundaries of the firm are no
longer a safe haven” (Davis et al. 2006, 19). Respect for
ethical values is linked to trust. According to the litera-
ture, reputation is a result of trustworthy behavior (Swift
2001; see also Jøsang et al. 2007, Eisenegger 2009, 11-12).
Trust is a fundament of every relationship – both business
and non-business (Perrini et al. 2010, 195). Therefore, trust
is an important asset when addressing ethical issues in
business and building a reputation of a good corporation.
Castaldo and others argue that trust “provides the cultural
basis and the ‘glue’ that promote ethical behavior, and dis-
courages deviation from ethical norms” (Castaldo et al.
2010, 657). Therefore, corporations that are trusted are be-
lieved to make moral decisions, and the other way around
– corporations that make moral decisions are trusted (see
also Jallai 2017). In short, companies that make moral de-
cisions and are therefore trusted, also have a better reputa-
tion. This was also shown in the Starbucks’ case discussed
above. Butwhat shouldwemake ofmoral decisionmaking
with regard to legal obligations; especially in the context
of tax planning?
As stated, ethical behavior may entail going beyond
what is required by (the letter of) the law. In the same vein,
the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015b,
34) state that “even in areas where stakeholder interests
are not legislated, many firms make additional commit-
ments to stakeholders, and concern over corporate repu-
tation and corporate performance often requires the recog-
nition of broader interests.” Ethical behavior that goes be-
yond what the law demands enhances the trust of stake-
holders and society at large. “High ethical standards are
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in the long term interests of the company as a means to
make it credible and trustworthy, not only in day-to-day
operations but also with respect to longer term commit-
ments” (OECD 2015b, 47). Businesses going beyond what
is required by the law thus show awareness of the pub-
lic demand to go beyond the morality that is codified in
the legal system. They may be driven by intrinsic motiva-
tion to behave ethically. Voluntary commitments by com-
panies to go beyond minimalist compliance with the let-
ter of law may also include tax planning strategies, for ac-
cording to these G20/OECD Principles (2015b, 47) “aggres-
sive tax avoidance” does not fit in an “overall framework
for ethical conduct [that] goes beyond compliancewith the
law,which should always be a fundamental requirement.”
Ethical behavior entailing going beyond the letter of the
tax law is also one of the crucial elements of a CSR-policy,
as will be shown in the following section.
CSR can play an important role in building “compet-
itive advantage by enhancing the reputation and legit-
imacy of the organization” (Kurucz et al. 2008, 90-91).
For a corporation like Starbucks, which is in the eye of
the storm and fundamentally believes that it should act
responsibly, CSR could be a tool to (re-)build this trust
and thereby also corporations’ competitive position (Lewis
2003, Porter 2003, Wan-Jan 2006, 180). CSR can thus be
considered as a means to build better corporate reputa-
tion (Wan-Jan 2006, 180). Therefore, we believe that cor-
porations should employ CSR to build better tax morale
and thereby also better reputation.Moreover, corporations
that already endorse CSR should be more responsible and
transparent in their tax matters in order to (re)gain their
stakeholders’ trust, as some multinationals have tried. In
the next section, we will elaborate on this point of view.
7 Companies that Play Fair
The foregoing shows that a company’s (aggressive) tax
planning strategy may have consequences in terms of rep-
utational costs that can be related to the loss of public trust
in companies. As argued above (§2 and §5), there is more
to taxation than the financial aspect, for taxes are a con-
tribution to the society, which in turn involves morality,
and thus paying taxes entails a moral choice. This raises
the question concerning how can companies take into ac-
count both the aspects of taxes.
Companies that acknowledge (moral) obligations to-
wards society can opt to implement social responsibility
policies (we further call them CSR companies). CSR in re-
lation to law is a business strategy that reflects the areas in
which the company (aims to) stepbeyondpure compliance
with the letter of the law (McBarnet 2007, 48-50). CSR can
have many different definitions depending on the context
and subject from which the viewpoint definition comes.11
For instance, both the EU (European Commission CSR)
and the OECD (CSR) have contributed attention to the so-
cial responsibilities of corporations. According to the Eu-
ropean Commission, CSR “refers to companies voluntar-
ily going beyond what the law requires to achieve social
and environmental objectives during the course of their
daily business activities” (European Commission CSR).
The OECD (CSR FAQ) refers to “the mutual dependence
of business and society” where “corporate responsibility"
concerns the corporate role in this relationship. The OECD
also states that “the core element of corporate responsibil-
ity concerns business activity itself” and adds that “corpo-
rate responsibility goes beyond the core function of con-
ducting business” (OECD CSR FAQ). Moreover, the OECD
expects that businesses comply next to the written laws
also with the “societal expectations that are not written
down as formal law” (OECD CSR FAQ). These elements of
the OECD and EU definitions give some general indication
as towhat these regulators expect fromCSR. They both sig-
nal the significance of (voluntarily) moving beyond pure
compliance with the law.
In order to understand the essence of suchmoving be-
yond the letter of the law and complying with the societal
expectations and values, we turn to CSR theory. Carroll,
one of the most influential authors in this field, has devel-
oped a CSR Pyramid that describes four building blocks of
CSR: economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsi-
bilities (Carroll 1991).
According to Carroll (1991), corporations are a part of
the “social contract” and are therefore expected to pur-
sue their economic missions within the framework of the
law. Moreover, above the economic and legal layers, Car-
roll sees the ethical and philanthropic layers. Ethical re-
sponsibilities of a company go beyond the law and profit
making, and embody those standards, norms or expecta-
tions that reflect a concern for what consumers, employ-
ees, shareholders and the community regard as fair, just
or moral. He adds that it is expected that ethical respon-
sibilities – which are seen as the obligation to do what is
right, just and fair – are fulfilled (Carroll 1991, 42). Eth-
ical considerations go beyond compliance with the law.
The philanthropic layer of Carroll encompasses those cor-
11 For an overview of the term “corporate social responsibility”, see
Carroll 2008, 19; Benn and Bolton 2011, 56-63; Carroll 1999, 268;
Williams and Aguilera 2008, 452; Dahlsrud 2008.
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Figure 2: CSR Pyramid
Source: Carroll 1991, 42.
porate actions that are in response to the society’s expec-
tations of a good corporate citizen, for example, actively
engaging in activities or programmes to promote human
welfare or goodwill (Carroll 1991). Although Carroll’s CSR
theory has been substantially revised (Schwartz and Car-
roll 2003), the core elements of importance for the present
article remain the same. The purpose of this article is to
illustrate the general picture of CSR and not the mutual
relations among the building blocks, as specified in Car-
roll and Schwartz’s definition (Schwartz and Carroll 2003).
Therefore, we use the Pyramid theory.
Naturally, there are also other authors who have con-
tributed to the conceptualization of CSR (see, e.g., Wood
1991; Frederick 1994). However, Carroll’s theory (with its
core ethical considerations as “beyond compliance”) fits
well with the nature of tax planning. Thus, the distinc-
tion between different kinds of obligations is very useful
with regard to (aggressive) tax planning, as will be shown.
Moreover, Carroll’s theory reflecting on social contract and
moral values also fits inwith the view of Painewho argued
that the morality involves how we act in a society in rela-
tion to others (see §2 - §4).
CSR and ethical business making as such are already
on the agendas of many corporations, but also of law and
policy framing institutions. For example, since the intro-
duction of EU Directive 2006/46/EC (2006), all the listed
companies in the European Union are obliged to pub-
lish their CSR statements. What such statements exactly
should entail is unclear. Therefore, the question still re-
mains as to whether these published strategies can also
be regarded as acting socially responsible.
In our opinion, a corporation engaging in CSR can be
driven by two differentmotives: intrinsic and extrinsicmo-
tives.12 Intrinsicmotives are a characteristic of an integrity-
based approach. Morality drives the company, although
of course economic performance (profits) and compliance
with the law are relevant factors. Integrity is based on the
concept of self-governance “in accordance with a set of
guiding principles” (Paine 1994, 111). The intrinsicmotiva-
tion is directly connected to morality, to an internal drive
to do what is right, just and fair. The extrinsic motivation,
on the other hand, indicates that a corporation behaves in
a certain way because of some (external) reward, coercion
or a desire to avoid penalties or bad press. Extrinsic moti-
vation is, therefore, a feature of an instrumentalist moral-
ity; the societal acceptance of a company’s ethical behav-
ior is exclusivelymeasured by the lack of public resistance.
Here, the “status” or “good reputation” is a matter of pub-
lic relations and is thus not guided by an intrinsic drive to
be open and transparent (Ulrich 2008, 400). Thus, intrin-
sic motivation is driven by moral principles while extrin-
sic motivation is driven by self-interest. However, commu-
nicative transparency that is a matter of extrinsic motiva-
tion is not a matter of principle.
When an extrinsic motivation prevails, the firm’s re-
sponsible behavior is not driven by an internal wish to do
what is right, just and fair. Without an intrinsic motiva-
tion, a CSR approach is seen as an instrument to purely en-
hance thefirm’s reputation (which, in turn,will oftenbe an
instrument to achieve something else, for example an in-
crease inmarket value) (Freedman 2006, 384), andnot as a
by-product of responsible behavior (Benn andBolton 2011,
57-58).13 Thus, CSR actions can be attributed to both intrin-
sic and extrinsic motives (Du et al. 2007, 226). For a busi-
ness, it is probably easier to motivate its actions from an
extrinsic perspective, because usually in a business con-
text, the cost-benefit analysis prevails. Nevertheless, in or-
der to be a true moral leader in the market, CSR should be
initiated from an intrinsic perspective. That is because the
corporations that are driven by an extrinsic motivation do
12 Compare the view of CSR as a moral obligation towards society
and stakeholders in contradistinction with the view of CSR as a pure
marketing tool, for example, Salazar and Husted 2008, 147-150; Gar-
riga andMelé 2004, 51; Benn and Bolton 2011, 14-17, 56-62, 112-113, 115-
118.
13 This may also be labelled as “passive tax responsibility” versus
“active tax responsibility”. See, for example, Cerioni 2014, 851-852.
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not reach above the legal layer of Carroll’s pyramid as their
motivation serves economic goals within the (letter of the)
law. But how can corporations show an intrinsic (good) in-
tention with regard to taxation and thereby becomemoral
leaders in this respect?
8 Tax Planning and Corporate
Social Responsibility
The above discussion proves that corporations have to
deal with the moral and societal choices when planning
taxes. According to Ruggie, “social norms exist over and
above compliance with laws and regulations” (Ruggie
2013, 91). Therefore, businesses are not free to do as they
wish to increase their income, market share or alike. Cor-
porations minimizing their tax liability behave irresponsi-
bly in the eyes of the public – at least as long as they use
their corporate power for law avoidance to create various
tax structures (Jallai 2017). The fact that taxes are moral
phenomena places them also at the heart of the notion of
CSR. This commitment to CSR should be consistently ap-
plied to all the company’s dealings and activities. Never-
theless, in practice, the link between taxplanning andCSR
isnot all that clear yet. Therefore,wewill have a closer look
at the question as to how companies can show that they
are behaving in a morally responsible way when it comes
to tax planning.
Despite the unclear concept of fair share (see §5),
many people believe that multinationals tend not to pay
their fair share (see, e.g., Happé 2007, Happé 2015, UK
HMRC 2012). In order to establish the actual meaning of
this concept in tax practice and the elbow room it leaves
to multinationals, public debate is necessary. Socially re-
sponsible companies should, therefore, be willing to dis-
cuss their tax planning, which demands certain openness
on their part. Having said that, one could distinguish a
substantive approach and a procedural approach to inte-
grate tax planning into the CSR agenda. A substantive ap-
proach focuses on the amount of tax that a company pays,
and asks whether this is more than is demanded by mere
compliance with the letter of the law (stripped to the bone
by gaming the rules; §5). A procedural approach provides
information on a company’s tax strategy, for instance on
howmuch corporate income tax it pays in all the countries
it operates in. Here, transparency is key (Gutmann 2010,
546-547). Thus, a key element of Carroll’s CSR theory, the
idea of “going beyond compliance” can be defined in two
layers:
– substantive good tax governance: taking into ac-
count the spirit of the law, or at least not stretching
the letter of the law for paying nil corporate income
tax in countries where the company operates; and
– procedural good tax governance: transparency, go-
ing beyond compliance with legal disclosure re-
quirements and reporting obligations.
Both layers, substantial and procedural, are a part
of CSR. Furthermore, they interact, as will be explained.
Transparency can be viewed as a door to corporate ac-
countability. In other words, a dialogue between a corpo-
ration and its stakeholders demands transparency. Natu-
rally, the authors of this article acknowledge that “trans-
parency” is a broad and complicated concept (see, e.g.,
Schnackenberg and Tomlinson 2016). For the purposes of
this article, transparency is considered as a principle of
being open about one’s tax planning practices. As trans-
parency in corporate tax matters reflects an ethical value,
we conceptualize it as a principle. Conceptualizing trans-
parency as a principle accounts for intrinsic motivation
and thus moral considerations which drive a socially re-
sponsible company.
In practice, regulatory attempts to tie tax and ethics
(or at least better governance), such as the OECD BEPS
Action Plan (OECD BEPS), the EU Action Plan (European
Commission 2016a), but also VBDO Good Tax Governance
standards, and ISO 26000 standards, have been under-
taken. The focus of all these lies on transparency. The
European Commission, for instance, states that “trans-
parency is a crucial element in securing fairer taxation”,
adding that the Commission has “given high priority to im-
proving tax transparency in the Single Market” (European
Commission 2015a, see also European Commission 2015b,
European Commission 2016a).
One of the reasons why various international regula-
tory approaches aim to create more transparency in tax
planning discussions is to minimize information asymme-
try. The latter is a term that is widely used in economics to
describe situations in which one party to a transaction or
agreement has less information than the other (see, e.g.,
Stiglitz 2002, 469-470). In tax matters, information asym-
metry paves the way, for example, for fair-share discus-
sions. An illustration of a regulatory attempt to minimize
information asymmetry could be, for example, the Euro-
pean Commission which “promotes the three principles
of good tax governance – namely transparency, exchange
of information and fair tax competition – in relations be-
tween states” (European Commission 2011). Enterprises
are also encouraged, where appropriate, to work towards
the implementation of these principles. The EU is fight-
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ing against tax avoidance with its action plan for fair cor-
porate taxation in the EU.14 The policy in the EU focuses
among others on transparency between themember states
in order to eliminate information and knowledge gaps (Eu-
ropean Commission 2015b). Amongst other measures, the
EU has introduced the country-by-country reporting be-
tween Member States’ tax authorities to enhance trans-
parency (Administrative Cooperation Directive). Also, the
OECD has developed a country-by-country reporting (CbC
reporting) measure as developed under Action 13 of the
BEPS Action Plan (OECD BEPS). The aim of CbC report-
ing is to increase transparency towards tax authorities for
tackling aggressive tax planning issues (OECD 2015a). CbC
reporting encompasses a three-tiered approach to transfer
pricing documentation that should consist of amaster file,
a local file and a CbC report. Moreover, there is a proposal
for public CbC reporting to enhance public scrutiny of cor-
porate income taxes borne by multinationals which will
‘further foster corporate responsibility’ (European Com-
mission 2016b, 9).15 However, these regulatory measures
have also earned some criticism (see, e.g., Cockfield and
MacArthur 2015; Nouwen 2017). Nevertheless, a consid-
eration of whether this specific form of regulatory trans-
parency works is beyond the scope of this article.
However, a noteworthy question for this article is
whether and what kind of relationship there is between
corporate transparency and aggressive tax planning. Ex-
isting research suggests that corporate transparency and
aggressive tax planning are negatively correlated (Balakr-
ishnan et al. 2012). Therefore, by communicating openly
about their strategies, companies have the possibility to
substantiate their belief that they act in a morally sound
way. This, in turn,may be a proof of an intrinsicmotivation
to endorse CSR. Thus, the first step towards showing an in-
trinsicmotive in relation to taxation is transparency.When
a corporation is convinced that its tax planning practices
are legal and legitimate (responsible), it should be able to
report this openly to the public. If a corporation does feel
the need to hide something, it should be seen as a red flag.
Naturally, the use and translation of this information for
the wider public should be handled in a fair and educated
way by the receiver (such as media and politicians, for in-
stance). We, however, focus on the corporate perspective.
14 See European Commission’s Agenda for the Fair Corporate
Taxation in the EU information chart: http://ec.europa.eu/taxat
ion_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/com
pany_tax/anti_tax_avoidance/timeline_without_logo.png. Accessed
02 March 2017.
15 For more detailed discussion of CbC Reporting, see OECD 2015a
and European Commission 2016b.
9 Good tax governance
Transparency is one of the key principles of CSR (see, e.g.,
ISO 2010, 14). Therefore, companies that engage in CSR
should also be transparent about their tax practices. But
how could these tax practices live up to the concept of
CSR? Naturally, the above-explained CSR Pyramid of Car-
roll is not a perfect theory, but it does indicate some lines to
follow for a company that drives to be a good corporate citi-
zen. Looking at Carroll’s Pyramid, the fundamental blocks
for a company are economic and legal responsibilities. In
the context of tax, one can translate it in a way that corpo-
rations first have to plan their taxes and thereby reason-
ably lower their (tax) costs, the economic layer. Moreover,
companies must plan their taxes within the framework of
the law – the legal layer. Taken together these two layers
account for the fact that companies have the legal right to
structure their affairs in a tax favorable way.Whenmoving
further in the pyramid, the ethical layer reflects the sub-
stantive part of good tax governance.
The easiest way to use this Pyramid as a practical
guide is to think that everything that does not fit in the
pyramid should not be done. Moreover, everything that
does not fit in the economic, legal and ethical layer should
not be done by a CSR company that wants to show moral
leadership in tax matters. Naturally, to which extent a cor-
poration should consider other responsibilities in addition
to economic and legal ones, is an area that needs more re-
search. One thing is, nevertheless, certain: for CSR com-
panies, there are also ethical considerations in addition to
legal and economic oneswhendefining and implementing
a business strategy and making decisions. Multinationals
that claim to be CSR companies should not engage in fiscal
engineering in order to pay (almost) no corporate income
taxes in the societies in which they operate.
CSR might not be a quick solution to diminish aggres-
sive tax planning practices, but it does open a door for
discussion in order to establish what are legitimate or ac-
ceptable tax planning practices. Transparency and open-
ness, from the perspective of corporations, are a precon-
dition for a focused discussion, for it is necessary to get
the facts right and take on board different perspectives.
This, in turn, helps corporations to protect (or where nec-
essary to re-establish) or advance their reputation. Fur-
thermore, transparency and the inclusion of tax in CSR
reporting would help to minimize the information asym-
metry gap that, in current debates, seems to confuse the
understanding of the problem. One of the most signifi-
cant procedural elements of CSR is reportingandopenness
(see, e.g., McBarnet 2007, 32-37; GRI Sustainability Report-
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ing). Transparency is never an end in itself; it is always
a means to some other value, for example accountability.
In any case, transparency and openness are the first steps
towards moral tax behavior. Moreover, transparency is a
precondition for accountability and open debate, which is
also crucial in creating a better tax compliance environ-
ment. A debate promotes a better understanding of factors
that businesses take into account in their taxdecisions and
themoral acceptability of tax planning practices. A fruitful
debate is indispensable for developing standards of sub-
stantive good tax governance.
It is important to note that in order to show moral
awareness that is advocated in this article, companies
should publish relevant information concerning their tax
planningpractices, rather than simplypublishingasmuch
(confusing) information as possible (which might be per-
ceived as self-serving hypocrisy). Communication of rele-
vant information is the key to an openmoral debate. What
matters is the quality, and not the quantity, of information.
Corporations should not communicate only about what
they do, but also why they do certain things. Multination-
als should be open about their motives in order to con-
tribute to a fruitful and much needed discussion. Compa-
nies themselves need such discussion as well since they
also need to understand what is accepted by the societies
in which they operate and what could cause possible rep-
utational damage. Naturally, transparency and openness
should not be confused with an obligation to publish sen-
sitive business information that may harm a company’s
competitive position. Conceptualizing transparency as a
principle means that there may be other principles which
act as a counterargument andmay thus carry more weight
(Gribnau 2014). This may lead, for example, to a deci-
sion to partially publish certain information. The idea be-
hind transparency, as discussed in this article, is that third
parties would understand a firm’s tax policy (e.g., why it
takes certain tax decisions and which intentions are driv-
ing those decisions).
Transparency in tax matters can thus be seen as a
bridge for connecting tax and CSR. Transparency, how-
ever, should be seen as a first step towards finding a so-
lution to aggressive tax planning, rather than a solution in
itself. It is a necessary precondition for an informed pub-
lic debate. In this way, transparency may have an educa-
tive function.As Stevensnotes, transparency “will force all
stakeholders in a tax system to answer difficult moral and
justification questions about how that system works and
the foundations on which it is based” (Stevens 2014, 708).
More transparency, as mentioned, would decrease the ex-
isting information asymmetry. As such, it may accelerate
and sharpen the necessary discussions around fair share
and tax morale, and contribute to changing the mind-set
surrounding aggressive tax planning. In order to change
the situation, companies need to change the mind-set and
start viewing tax as an element of doing good and behav-
ing just.
10 Irresponsible tax planning
versus good tax governance
It goes without saying that there is also criticism on view-
ing taxation in the context of CSR. Some scholars, for in-
stance Van der Geld (2006), seem to argue that almost all
responsibility lies with the legislature. To his mind, the
legislature enacts all too often sloppy tax laws and the
taxpayers have a right to take advantage of the sloppy
tax legislation (Van der Geld 2006). Moreover, aggressive
tax planning, like stateless income planning, is sometimes
perceived as the result of (harmful) tax competition be-
tween nations (Panayi 2015, 445). This argument seems to
imply that all the responsibility lieswith states and there is
no need for any moral reflection by taxpayers. This line of
thinking is often thought to be reinforced by stressing the
clear legal distinction between tax legal avoidance and il-
legal tax evasion. Exit morality. But is it? States engaging
in tax competition indeed bear responsibility for the lack
of coordination of tax systems – although tax policy ap-
pears to respond primarily to those, such asMNCswith the
resources to influence the policymakers (Christians 2017),
this often amounts to “the substantive tax law shameless-
ness that marks much corporate tax lobbying” (Kleinbard
2013, 1517). Unfortunately, however, the notion of shared –
be it asymmetric – responsibility is not dealt with (Gribnau
2017b). It is not as if there are tax planning opportunities
and therefore choices to bemade that one is at liberty to do
whatever one pleases. Morality simply does not work like
that. Freedom of choice entails moral responsibility. Here,
themoral responsibilitymeans taking into account the dif-
ference between legitimately making use of opportunities
present in the international tax system and engineering
by setting up complex and artificial structures tominimize
one’s tax liability. Indeed, tax planning is a matter of de-
gree, but at the end of the day, making use of choices to
structure one’s affairs in a tax efficientwayhas to bedistin-
guished from exploiting the tax system–minimizing one’s
tax liability by all means. This lack of moral responsibil-
ity results in, for example, a stateless income, that is, “in-
come that through internal tax planning, first becomes un-
moored from the host country where it is earned and then
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sets sail for the tax haven of choice” (Kleinbard 2013, 1516;
see §5).
Some positions seem to be more refined. For instance,
Panayi, although she admits that the connection between
CSR and taxes is almost inevitable (Panayi 2015, 558), tries
to build a case against viewing tax in the context of CSR.
Panayi, leaning on the forgotten role of other actors, such
as states, in this context, does not agree that corporations
that engage aggressive tax planning are socially irrespon-
sible. She claimsmoreover that CSR is a vague concept that
adds “further complexity and uncertainty to an already
complicated area” (Panayi 2015, 544). Panayi argues also
that “a company (or better, its management) in a high tax
jurisdiction may be more justified in ‘feeling’ that it does
not owe anything to the society and that it is acceptable
to try to minimize its very high taxes and mitigate the im-
pact of world-wide taxation” while “the management of a
company in a jurisdiction which does not have such high
taxes may not necessarily ‘feel’ that it owes more to so-
ciety and that it should refrain from aggressive tax plan-
ning” (Panayi 2015, 555). This, however, suggests a mis-
understanding of the essence of CSR. Namely, CSR is not
about “feeling” that it is about being responsible towards a
cooperative society that CSR companies claim to be. Being
a part of the society includes the obligations to contribute
in such society as well, next to the rights to enjoy the fruits
of this society.
It thus is not a matter of what “is” (be it a kind of feel-
ing), but what “ought”. In the end, a company ought to
behave (not only feel) responsible vis-à-vis society; that is
exactly what business ethics and more specifically CSR is
about. Companies that do not fulfil their obligations enjoy
their benefit from society and all kinds of public goods at
the cost of other members of this society; they are free rid-
ers. Naturally, it is a nuanced and complex issue, as Panayi
correctly points out, and taxes are a cost item. However,
claiming that CSR is an unjustified concept in this context
is misleading. Especially the corporations that themselves
already claim to be CSR companies cannot free ride on so-
ciety’s public goods and services by engaging in aggressive
tax planning. Being a CSR company involves certain obli-
gations towards the society and this has nothing to dowith
the ‘feeling’. Naturally, it can be that there are trade-offs
between different domains of corporate actions in relation
to CSR (e.g., labor or environment). This, however is a sub-
ject for further research and is therefore not dealt with in
this article.
Behaving ethically should be fundamental in all busi-
ness matters, including tax planning practices. However,
in order to foster a debate regarding what exactly is ethi-
cal, the companies should communicate about their prac-
tices in tax matters, as this opens a door to discussion
and paves the way toward a better understanding of tax
morale. At the end of the day, aggressive tax planning can-
not be resolved merely by changing the laws, for all laws
can be gamed; it demands also that the mind-set and atti-
tude are changed (McBarnet 2007, 48). In addition, extrin-
sic motivation, related to the reputation (see §6), can also
support the moral outcomes of corporate actions. Almost
inevitably, and legitimately, a company’s tax behavior is
driven by both intrinsic and extrinsic motives. However, if
the aim is to be a true moral leader, the intrinsic motiva-
tion should prevail. This is the hallmark of good tax gover-
nance.
11 Conclusion
The aggressive tax planning practices of multinationals
is currently a hotly debated topic. In the public debates,
the behavior of multinationals is frequently evaluated in
moral terms. Apparently, they are – like individuals – seen
as a part of society. At stake is how the members of society
should act in relation to each other, which is amoral issue.
Like individuals, corporations qualify as moral agents.
Therefore, companies must answer the question as to how
one ought to act in relation to other individuals and society
at large. Integrity demands that individuals think and act
within a moral framework of principles and strategy to se-
lect these principles and deal with conflicts among them.
Integrity means being guided by a set of ethical principles
and values.
It is argued in this article that tax planning involves
a moral stance because taxes are contributions to the so-
ciety. Paying a fair amount of taxes is taking the values
of reciprocity and solidarity seriously. Consequently, the
concepts of “aggressive tax planning”, “tax evasion” and
“tax avoidance” express different relationships between
law and morality. Notwithstanding their moral character,
taxes are a cost item for any taxpayer. Moreover, taxpayers
– thus, also corporations – have a right to structure their
affairs to achieve a favorable tax treatment within the lim-
its set by law. However, (corporate) taxpayers should bal-
ance this right with the duty of fair play towards society
and thereby impose restraints on themselves in taking ad-
vantage of the inevitable imperfections of the legal system.
By abstaining from aggressive tax planning, they take re-
sponsibility for the effects of their actions on society. Nat-
urally, the state is primarily responsible for a better (legal)
system. Nevertheless, perfect laws do not exist, as laws are
always subject to interpretation. This suggests that multi-
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nationals face choices, which in turn implies responsibil-
ity for them as well.
It was shown that (aggressive) tax planning practices
mayaffect a company’s reputation.Moral decisions, on the
other hand, have a positive impact on reputation and cor-
porate legitimacy. Moral decisionmaking in the context of
tax planning entails going beyondminimalist compliance,
beyond the letter of the tax law. This kind of ethical con-
duct beyond compliance fits well within a CSR-framework.
Therefore, companies that seek to prove moral leadership
can implement CSR policies. However, companies that al-
ready claim to have a CSR strategy in place must meet the
expectations on good tax governance for taxes are contri-
bution to a society.
When it comes to tax planning, the notion of “going
beyond the compliance” consists of two layers, one pro-
cedural and the other substantive. A good – socially re-
sponsible – tax governance entails both. With regard to
the substantive layer, based on Carroll’s CSR Pyramid, so-
cially responsible companies need to take into account
ethical considerations in addition to legal and economic
ones when defining and implementing a business strat-
egy and taking tax-related decisions. The procedural layer
involves the principle of transparency and thereby going
beyond compliance with legal reporting obligations. Good
tax governance is based on the intrinsic motivation to be
transparent, which goes beyond a mere cost-benefit anal-
ysis and mere concern for reputation and market value.
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